Ian Rumfitt has argued that rational adjudication against classical logic in quantum mechanics is not only unnecessary, but impossible as well. This paper explains why his argument fails.

Carnap maintained that a proper analysis of quantum mechanics requires rational reconstruction. The paper considers the possibility of reformulating the theory as a Carnapian language with an inferentialist semantics.

Weyl's interpretation of quantified formulas should not be conflated with Hilbert's. His semantic reasons for rejecting the law of excluded middle are based on a normative conception of transfinite mathematics as a system of conditional obligations.

This paper provides an algebraic reconstruction of Einstein’s argument for the incompleteness of quantum mechanics, in order to clarify the assumptions that underlie an understanding of Einstein completeness as categoricity.

The paper discusses Peano's defense and application of permanence of forms as a principle of mathematical practice. (Dedicated to the memory of Mic Detlefsen.).

The paper argues against an intuitive reading of the Stone-von Neumann theorem as a categoricity result, thereby pointing out that this theorem does not entail any model-theoretical difference between the theories that validate it and those that don't.

A new form of skepticism is described, which holds that objectivity and understanding are incompossible ideals of modern science. This is attributed to Weyl, hence its name: Weylean skepticism. Two general defeat strategies are then proposed, one of which is rejected.

This paper considers Weylean invariantism, i.e., the view that objectivity requires categoricity, and argues that if the Stone-von Neumann theorem can be naturally interpreted as a categoricity result, the view is falsified by quantum field theory.

This paper argues that Carnap's project in the Aufbau is best considered as an attempt to determine the conditions for both objectivity and understanding, thus aiming at refuting the skeptical contention that objectivity and understanding are incompossible ideals of science.

The paper argues that Bohr understood his correspondence principle, or at least an aspect of it expressed by the notion of rational generalization, as grounded in Hankel's principle of permanence.

This special issue includes papers authored by Carsten Held, Elise Crull, Johanna Wolff, Elay Shech, Richard Dawid, and Gábor Hofer-Szabó.

This paper argues that Weyl's view that scientific objectivity requires that concepts be freely created, i.e., introduced via Hilbert-style axiomatizations, led him to abandon the phenomenological view of objectivity.

This paper argues that whereas Mach understood thought economy as a principle of practical rationality, Husserl rejected it as a principle of theoretical rationality. The distinction is further supported by their correspondingly different readings of the principle of permanence.

This paper argues that Weyl's criticism of Dedekind’s principle that "In science, what is provable ought not to be believed without proof." challenges not only a logicist norm of belief in mathematics, but also a realist view about whether there is a fact of the matter as to what norms of belief are correct.

This paper argues that Weyl took formalism to prevail over intuitionism with respect to supporting scientific objectivity, rather than grounding classical mathematics. This is the respect in which he came to reject pure phenomenology as well.

This paper argues against the view that the standard explanation of phase transitions in statistical mechanics may be considered a causal explanation, a distortion that can nevertheless successfully represent causal relations.

This paper, written in Romanian, compares fictionalism, nominalism, and neo-Meinongianism as responses to the problem of objectivity in mathematics, and then motivates a fictionalist view of objectivity as invariance.

The paper sketches an argument against modal monism, more specifically against the reduction of physical possibility to metaphysical possibility. The argument is based on semantic aspects of non-distributive quantum logic.

This paper rejects metaphysical realism about structural universals as a basis for mathematical realism about numbers, and argues that one construal of structural universals via non-well-founded sets should be resisted by the mathematical realist.

This unpublished paper, written in 2005 in the PhD philosophy program at Notre Dame, argues that algebraic structural realism faces a potentially fatal difficulty raised by the existence of inequivalent representations in quantum field theory.

This paper introduces Weylean skepticism, the view that objectivity and intelligibility are opposite ideals of science, explains the motivation for it and the argument that justifies it. The paper indicates also a couple of ways in which this skepticism could be resisted.

A one-page editorial including one-sentence summaries of papers authored by Carsten Held, Elise Crull, Johanna Wolff, Elay Shech, Richard Dawid, and Gábor Hofer-Szabó.

This a special issue on philosophy of logic, addressing a variety of topics like the grammar of first-order logic and the axiomatization of evolutionary biology.

This paper analyzes some examples of diagrammatic proofs in elementary mathematics. It suggests that the cognitive features that allow us to understand such proofs are extensions of the cognitive features that allow us to navigate the physical world.

This paper argues that a particular point raised by Schröder – that Frege's logical notation fails to be modelled on arithmetical notation – is based on a misunderstanding, for the modelling was meant as conceptual, rather than notational.

This paper, written in Romanian, explains why the eutaxiological argument, endorsed by scientists like Newton, Einstein, and Weyl, and recently defended by Richard Swinburne, is not defensible.

This paper argues that Noether's axiomatic method in algebra cannot be assimilated to Weyl's late view on axiomatics, for his acquiescence to a phenomenological epistemology of correctness led Weyl to resist Noether's principle of detachment.

This paper proposes a diagrammatic reconstruction of Carnap's formal method of quasianalysis in the Aufbau and then explains on that basis why Quine's criticism of Carnap's constitution of physical space fails.

This paper argues that whereas Mach understood thought economy as a principle of practical rationality, Husserl rejected it as a principle of theoretical rationality. The distinction is further supported by their correspondingly different readings of the principle of permanence.

This book concerns the metasemantics of quantum mechanics (QM). Roughly, it pursues an investigation at an intersection of the philosophy of physics and the philosophy of language, and it offers a critical analysis of rival explanations of the semantic facts of standard QM. Two problems for such explanations are discussed: categoricity and permanence. New results include 1) a reconstruction of Einstein's incompleteness argument, which concludes that a local, separable, and categorical QM cannot exist, 2) a reinterpretation of Bohr's principle of (...) correspondence, grounded in the principle of permanence, 3) a meaning-variance argument for quantum logic, which follows a line of critical reflections initiated by Weyl, and 4) an argument for semantic indeterminacy leveled against inferentialism about QM, inspired by Carnap's work in the philosophy of classical logic. (shrink)

This paper explains why spacetime singularities do not constitute a breakdown of physical laws, and points out that the difference between the metrics at singularities and those outside of singularities is factual, rather than nomological.

Geoffrey Hellman has argued that non-truth-functionality entails a change of meaning between classical and quantum logical connectives. This paper criticizes and significantly improves the argument.

We argue that, if taken seriously, Kripke's view that a language for science can dispense with a negation operator is to be rejected. Part of the argument is a proof that positive logic, i.e., classical propositional logic without negation, is not categorical.

An introduction to the Synthese topical collection "Humeanisms".

This special issue includes papers authored by Sean Morris, Tudor M. Baetu, Tamás Demeter, Dan O’Brien, Barbara Vetter, Daniel Dohrn, Elizabeth S. Radcliffe, Barry Loewer, Aaron Segal, Miren Boehm, Vera Matarese, Stefanie Rocknak, Rachel Cohon, David Mark Kovacs, and Michael Esfeld.

Timothy Williamson has maintained that the applicability of classical mathematics in science raises a problem for the endorsement, in non-mathematical domains, of a wide range of non-classical logics. We show that this is false.

This entry reviews Carnap's philosophical views on the quantum mechanics of his time. It also offers some thoughts on how he might have reacted to some recent developments in the foundations of quantum mechanics.

This collection offers a historical survey of the tradition of scientific philosophy in Romania, and examines some problems in the foundations of logic, mathematics, linguistics, the natural and social sciences. Among the more specific topics, it considers scientific explanation, models, and mechanisms, as well as memory, artifacts, and rules of research.

This paper attempts to motivate the view that instead of rejecting modus ponens as invalid in certain situations, one could preserve its validity by associating such situations with non-normal interpretations of logical connectives.

Dans les années 1900, la cérémonie du thé fut érigée en art total, comme la quintessence même de l’esprit japonais. Par-delà le biais des enjeux politiques de cette artification, le discours académique portant sur la cérémonie du thé a également été perméable à l’esprit contradictoire inhérent à cette pratique. Nous tentons de dépasser ces difficultés par une vision réticulaire de l’art telle que la défend Simondon dans sa techno-esthétique, tandis que la Glass Tea House Mondrian de Sugimoto Hiroshi offre une (...) métaphore permettant d’approfondir la place de l’abstraction dans la voie du thé. Dans cette réflexion, au détriment de l’objet réel conçu comme une entité isolée, le geste technique, outillé, s’avère jouer un rôle plus déterminant que ne lui accorde la tradition. (shrink)

I welcome Mr Kennedy's general approach, but query whether the concept of consumerism is so closely applicable to medical care as he maintains. However, in particular aspects, especially the handling of complaints, his criticisms echo those made by the Patients Association. Finally, I detect some ground for hope in the more enlightened attitude creeping in to the eduction of the medical student.